[GushShalom] Sharon cleared of charges - bulldozers work overtime
Gush Shalom (Israeli Peace Bloc)
info at gush-shalom.org
Fri Jun 18 23:13:15 IDT 2004
GUSH SHALOM - pob 3322, Tel-Aviv 61033 - www.gush-shalom.org/
International release, June 18
÷éùåøéí ìòáøéú / links to Hebrew
[] The latest news about the route of the Wall
[] The buddies - Gush comment on the whitewashing of Sharon
[] So is there someone to talk to - or is there not?
# Yediot photo of June 4 commented by Rami Elhanan
# Haaretz June 11 - beginning of security establishment revelations
A week of increasing debate
Haaretz June 18 - Arafat interview
***
[] The latest news about the route of the Wall
We just heard through activist David Nir that he got a phonecall from
Sawiya (not Azawiya about which we have been writing before). This
morning bulldozers arrived, without any prior warning, and started
destroying the villagers' olive groves, those most near to the settlement
of Rehelim to its north. Soldiers told them that it is for "the fence."
Sawiya is some ten kilometers east of the Ariel settlement,
located in the very middle of the West Bank... The work is still going on though
the Sabbat has started - a highly unusual behavior, giving the impression that
Sharon is in a very big hurry to create even more facts.
[] The buddies - Gush comment on the whitewashing of Sharon
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The buddies get back together
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
òáøéú áàúø / Hebrew on the website
www.gush-shalom.org
[ad in this weekend's Ha'aretz Hebrew edition]
Attorney General Meni Mazuz has published the decision that everyone had been
waiting for since he was appointed to his job by the Sharon government: he
acquitted Sharon from all wrongdoing.
This decision clears the way for the Labor Party to join the government.
Shimon Peres' dream is coming true. He will again be able to travel around the
world as Sharon's chief spokesman.
This way Sharon can go on undisturbed promoting his "Disengagement" deception,
destroying the basis of existence of the Palestinian people, killing Palestinians,
building the monstrous wall and wrecking all our chances to achieve peace.
But what are generations of war compared to one day of Shimon Peres in the
government?
-----------
Gush Shalom,
Help us maintain our weekly ad - with donations to:
P.O.Box 3322, Tel-Aviv 61033, Israel
------------------------------------
***
[] So is there someone to talk to - or is there not?
# Yediot photo of June 4 commented by Rami Elhanan
# Haaretz June 11 - beginning of security establishment revelations
a week of increasing debate:
Haaretz June 18 - Arafat interview
# Yediot photo of June 4 commented by Rami Elhanan
[Hebrew attached - òáøéú îö"á ]
English
<http://www.gush-shalom.org/english/NoOneToTalkTo2.jpg>
# Haaretz June 11 - beginning of security establishment revelations
A week of increasing debate:
Haaretz June 18 - Arafat interview
[We didn't immediately pass on Akiva Eldar's article "Popular misconceptions" with
the scoop of the by now internationally-publicized accusations from within the
security establishment against the orchestrated anti-Arafat campaign started after
Camp David, 2000. At last it is admitted that the demonization of Arafat wasn't
based on any facts.
Why we didn't pass it on? At first we felt bitter that only now this comes out, and
we also didn't want to seem saying "I told you so". But since its publication a
week ago, the article is not going away anymore. It opened an ongoing discussion in
which more and more people of the security establishment as well as the long
hermetic media begin to open their mouths.
It is clear that the mistakes of the past - involving a very wide spectrum of
Israeli society(!) - have been disastrous and cannot be simply reversed. But even
though the thousands killed won't get back to life, it opens the perspective of
"rehabilitation" of the Palestinian leader, and it will make it more difficult for
Sharon to continue avoiding negotiatimg with the Palestinians.
Meanwhile, Akiva Eldar went to Ramallah, together with the new Ha'aretz editor in
chief David Landau, and today they publish an interview with the Palestinian
president in which he is shown to be still the Palestinian leader willing - and
probably the only one able - to do painful concessions in order to achieve peace
with his not so easy partner.]
Popular misconceptions
Akiva Eldar, Haaretz June 11
<http://ga3.org/ct/31aytDK1cBGJ>
òáøéú / Hebrew
<http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/438063.html>
Is Yasser Arafat really aiming for the destruction of Israel, rather
than a solution to the conflict? This perception has been turned into
conventional wisdom in Israel - but many in the intelligence community
just don't believe it.
On Sunday, while Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, a supporter of the
disengagement plan, was perspiring at the cabinet meeting, the head of
the Defense Ministry's diplomatic- security unit looked calm and serene.
Amos Gilad - who headed the research division of Military Intelligence
(MI) between 1996 and 2001, and was coordinator of activities in the
territories from 2001-03 - has gilt-edged shares in Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon's decision to turn to unilateral measures. It was he who provided
Sharon's predecessor, Ehud Barak, the professional backing for the "no
Palestinian partner" theory. The basis of this theory: Barak made a
generous offer to Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat, and when
the latter refused to accept it, his real face was exposed: that of a
terrorist who aims at the destruction of Israel.
This theory - which has earned the well-known epithet konseptzia
("conception" - harking back to mistaken assessments prior to the Yom
Kippur War) in the intelligence community - is believed by most Israelis
today and has also won many fans abroad. It was readily absorbed in
ground soaked with the blood of intifada victims. Mofaz, first as chief
of staff and then as defense minister, and Moshe Ya'alon, first as
Mofaz's deputy on the General Staff and later as his successor, adopted
the so-called konseptzia and spread it. Politicians from both right and
left agree with it, as does the director of MI, Major General Aharon
Ze'evi (Farkash).
Distinctions like those presented by Gilad on Sunday, at his office in
the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv, were welcomed by the Prime Minister's
Bureau. "Arafat is aiming to have Oslo lead to the fulfillment of his
strategy that Israel has no right to exist," said the man who headed the
research division at Military Intelligence during the period when the
Oslo agreement was gasping for breath and dying. "Arafat is a terrible
danger. Nothing will shake him as long as he lives. If he isn't dealt
with in the right way, he will also bequeath us a heritage that no one
will dare to change."
Thanks to the position in which he served and his powers of persuasion,
Gilad's konseptzia penetrated every home in Israel. But behind the doors
of a few homes, among them those of senior people in the intelligence
branches, different and even opposite assessments have been whispered
throughout. Amos Malka, who was head of MI from mid-1998 to the end of
2001, and was Gilad's direct superior, is one of them, and his version
is the opposite of Gilad's. He is joined in this by Major General (res.)
Ami Ayalon, who headed the Shin Bet security service up until a few
months before the intifada; in the approach taken by Arab affairs
specialist Mati Steinberg, who until a year ago was a special advisor on
Palestinian affairs to the head of the Shin Bet; and by Colonel (res.)
Ephraim Lavie, the research division official responsible for the
Palestinian arena at that time and Gilad's immediate subordinate.
Violence - catalyst or weapon?
Malka details the assessment of the situation he presented during his
days as "national assessor" to the General Staff and to the government.
>From time to time he peers at his papers and stresses that every word he
utters is anchored in situation assessments by the research division and
discussions with its professional echelons.
Malka: "The assumption was that Arafat prefers a diplomatic process,
that he will do all he can to see it through, and that only when he
comes to a dead end in the process will he turn to a path of violence.
But this violence is aimed at getting him out of a dead end, to set
international pressure in motion and to get the extra mile. This was the
assumption I found when I took up the position. Along the way, I was
able to confirm it myself and bring it to the [attention of the]
leaders. The classical example is the tunnel incidents - an initiated
move of violence that was aimed, from Arafat's perspective, at
instilling a sense of urgency. If you look into what happened after each
of his violent moves, you will find that in nearly every instance, he to
some extent achieved something.
"We received the best proof that Arafat supports a diplomatic move,"
says Malka, "in May 1999. Prior to this date [the original target date
for a permanent status agreement - A.E.], the whole country was caught
up in the huge crisis event that was about to occur - the unilateral
declaration of a Palestinian state. We at MI assessed that nothing would
happen in May 1999, and that Arafat would wait for the elections in
Israel, for the formation of a new government and for the formulation of
a policy."
Malka read from his notes from March 2000: "Should Arafat believe that
the channel of diplomatic talks is unable to advance him toward that
goal (a Palestinian state) in 2000, Arafat might well take unilateral
measures. If he realizes that progress is not in the realm of the
possible, the crisis could develop into following the path of armed
struggle. Conclusion: Without movement in the diplomatic process, which
would give Arafat a sense of real progress, there is a high likelihood
of hostilities."
What "real progress" would have prevented hostilities? Gilad insists
that Arafat has never let go of the vision of the right of return, in
order to shorten the way to demographic victory over Israel. The current
head of MI, Ze'evi, and former Mossad head Ephraim Halevy, share this
assessment: Arafat has not come to terms with the existence of a Jewish
state and has not given up the struggle to eliminate it.
Malka insists that their version has no backing in any research
document. "We assumed that it is possible to reach an agreement with
Arafat under the following conditions: a Palestinian state with
Jerusalem as its capital and sovereignty on the Temple Mount; 97 percent
of the West Bank plus exchanges of territory in the ratio of 1:1 with
respect to the remaining territory; some kind of formula that includes
the acknowledgement of Israel's responsibility for the refugee problem
and a willingness to accept 20,000-30,000 refugees. All along the way
... it was MI's assessment that he had to get some kind of statement
that would not depict him as having relinquished this, but would be
prepared for a very limited implementation."
Right of return crisis
The possibility of a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state in
September 2000, and the danger of a decline into violent conflict were
at the center of a discussion held in May 2000, in Barak's "Peace
Administration." The discussion was held in the shadow of Barak's public
threat that Israel's response would be severe, to the extent of
occupying territories. Participating in the discussion were the head of
the Administration, Dr. Oded Eran; the coordinator of activities in the
territories, Major General Yaakov (Mendy) Orr; Colonel Shaul Arieli,
Mati Steinberg and representatives of MI research. Orr and Steinberg
expected that the crisis would degenerate into a violent reaction on the
part of the Palestinian street. Steinberg added that an Israeli
incursion into the territories could also sweep along the Arabs of
Israel. It was in fact the MI people, Gilad's representatives, who
expressed reservations about this chilling thesis and suggested that the
reaction would be restricted to the level of propaganda, law and
diplomacy. According to the testimony of three of the participants in
the discussion, none of the MI people argued that Arafat was planning to
blow up the diplomatic process and return to the military option.
Several weeks later, on June 15, prior to his departure for Camp David,
Barak summoned a conference with a group of military people and
advisors. "This was one of the most exciting and most important
discussions in which I have ever had occasion to participate," recalls
Gilad, adding: "I warned Barak that Arafat will not give up on the
realization of his vision through the right of return." According to
some of the participants in the discussion, all the speakers agreed that
if Arafat did not get what he expected to achieve, he would turn to
limited violence. No one remembers that Arafat was said to be aiming for
the destruction of Israel through demography. There was also no mention
of the possibility that the Palestinians would abandon the peace process
in favor of a comprehensive armed struggle. No one, including Gilad
himself, argued that Arafat's expectations included Israeli agreement to
take in 300,000 to 400,000 refugees in the framework of the right of
return.
Confirmation that MI research did not believe that Arafat expected a
massive return of refugees can be found in a document of the information
team of the research division, which was headed by Gilad. The document
analyzes a position paper that was written in June, 1999, by Dr. Assad
Abed al-Rahman, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization
steering committee and the one in charge of the portfolio on refugees
and the uprooted. "In his discussion of the possible solutions to the
refugee problem, Abed al-Rahman presents a comprehensive and rigid
position, which even the Palestinian leadership has already understood
is no longer realistic," the document says. "Even those who hold an
`extreme' position on the issue, among them Arafat, have adopted the
position that if Israel recognizes the right of return in principle, its
implementation can be partial and limited."
In a lecture at Princeton University in March, 2002, the contents of
which have not been published until now, Steinberg argued that the Camp
David summit failed because of the dispute over the Temple Mount - not
over the issue of the right of return, which was barely discussed at
that summit and was born retrospectively in Israel in order to create
the internal consensus.
His remarks are congruent with the claim of Yossi Ginnosar, who
participated in the summit: In an interview with the mass-circulation
daily Yedioth Ahronoth before his death, he said that the idea that the
summit had failed because of the right of return was aimed at justifying
the failure and was "a duplicitous campaign that contributed to sowing
despair in Israeli society and caused damage to the process that was
conducted afterward."
At a conference under the auspices of the Peres Center for Peace that
was held in the spring of last year, Ephraim Lavie, who closely
accompanied the negotiations for a permanent status agreement, analyzed
the reasons for the summit's failure. He said that there is not and
there never was any basis for assuming that Arafat or any other
Palestinian leader would deviate from the resolution passed by the
Palestinian National Council in Algiers in 1988: the establishment of a
Palestinian state in the June, 1967 borders, with its capital in
Jerusalem, and a solution to the refugee problem.
However, Lavie stressed that since Oslo, the Palestinian leadership has
been aware that there is no chance that Israel will accept the element
of the right of return and implement it. The leadership is thus making
do with a recognition in principle of the right of return and of the
historical injustice, and is willing to accept a limited implementation,
to which Israel will agree.
Lavie, who was the intelligence officer in Barak's peace administration
, argues that "at Camp David, there was some sort of a solution in sight
to the refugee problem by means of compensation and a small number of
refugees who would return to Israel, under one definition or another ...
Israel saw Camp David as a crucial summit, and urged Arafat to concede
explicitly the right of return - something that the PLO institutions
have never approved. Arafat rejected this and dug in to his position
that every refugee must be given the right to decide whether to return
to the territories of 1949 or to accept a substitute and compensation,
and that the conflict will end only with the implementation of the
agreement. Israel interpreted this position as stemming from his
unwillingness to make the historic decision to concede the right of
return, and depicted this as evidence of his intention to demolish
Israel's existence."
A few weeks before Camp David, Malka reviewed Arafat's positions for the
cabinet. "I said there was no chance that he would compromise on 90
percent of the territories or even on 93 percent. He is not a real-
estate trader, and he is not going to stop midway. Barak said to me:
`You are telling me that if I offer him 90 percent, he isn't going to
take it? I don't accept your assessment.' I said to him that indeed,
there is no chance that he would accept it.
"Haim Ramon said: `Are you trying to tell me that if we offer him 77
percent and make a 20-year commitment to him for another 10 percent, and
another 20 percent, and in the end we stop at 90 percent - he won't
agree to this?' I told them that the difference between me and them is
that they are speaking from hope and I am trying to neutralize my hope
and give a professional assessment. But Barak saw himself as able to
make his assessments without assessments from MI, because he is his own
intelligence, and he thought he was smarter. Afterward, it was
convenient for him to explain his failure by a distorted description of
the reality."
Why the terror began
In his new book, "Hazit lelo oref" ("A Front Without a Rearguard: Voyage
to the Boundaries of the Peace Process"), Shlomo Ben Ami - who was
foreign minister and headed the team that negotiated with the
Palestinians in Barak's government - wrote that immediately after the
summit, "intelligence sources" picked up sounds from Ramallah that
encouraged "renewing the process for the complete fulfillment of the
chances for an agreement." According to his testimony, Barak himself was
partner then to the efforts to achieve a breakthrough. How does this
concord with the version that at Camp David "Arafat's true face was
revealed?" Why did the prime minister and the foreign minister continue
to waste their time on negotiations?
Malka insists that even after the peace talks gave way to hostilities,
MI did not revise its assessments. Neither did the research units at the
Shin Bet, the Mossad, the Foreign Ministry and the office of the
coordinator of activities in the territories adopt the thesis that the
Camp David summit had revealed "the Oslo plot."
The official working assumption at MI then stuck to the approach that
Arafat was continuing to see terror as a strategic weapon that could
reduce the gap between the Palestinians and Israel. But present MI head
Ze'evi, Defense Minister Mofaz and Chief of Staff Ya'alon adopted the
approach that there is no connection between the state of the peace
process and terror. According to Gilad, "Arafat is faithful to his
[perception] that terror can break us and will not allow the security
mechanism to deal with terror as long as his policy view (greater
Palestine) does not prevail."
Ami Ayalon, however, believes that when there is progress in sight in
the diplomatic field, the Palestinian Authority silences Hamas.
Steinberg, who was his advisor, backs this up. "The Palestinian
leadership's willingness to confront its internal opposition was
dependent on a single factor: progress in the implementation of interim
agreements or, at the very least, a political expectation of progress,"
he said at Princeton.
Steinberg explained that although the intifada was not preceded by
Palestinian planning and preparation, neither at the highest level nor
at the local level, "From the moment it erupted, Arafat and the majority
of Palestinians had an interest in exacerbating the crisis, on the
assumption that it would bear political fruit." Malka adds that with the
outbreak of hostilities, Arafat thought he was "going for something far
more limited, that would cause a shock ... After two or three days
Arafat was not able to go against the street."
Both of them share the argument that the top Israeli security echelon
contributed to fanning the flames. Malka relates that about a month
after the intifada began, was he was on his way to the Gilo neighborhood
in Jerusalem, he asked Yossi Kuperwasser, at the time the intelligence
officer of the Central Command (and today head of the research
division), how many 5.56 bullets the command had fired that month.
"Kuperwasser got back to me with number 850,000 bullets. My figure was
1.3 million bullets in the West Bank and Gaza. This is a strategic
figure that says that our soldiers are shooting and shooting and
shooting. I asked: `Is this what you intended in your preparations?' and
he replied in the negative. I said: `Then the significance is that we
are determining the height of the flames.' I brought the issue up at
Central Command discussions, but Mofaz went with the militant bit from
the very first day and all along the way."
Malka is convinced that today too, if Israel offers Arafat a state in 97
percent of the territories, with Jerusalem as the capital, exchanges of
territory and the return of 20,000-30,000 refugees - he will sign the
agreement and an order to lay down arms.
Malka: Gilad rewrote the analyses
While the issue of intelligence analyses submitted on the eve of the war
in Iraq was the subject of a comprehensive parliamentary investigation -
which found they were not based on reliable information, but rather on
assessments and assumptions - the gaps in analysis of the Palestinian
arena have never been examined.
The former head of Military Intelligence (MI), Amos Malka, has a
disturbing answer when asked where he was when his subordinate, Amos
Gilad, spread his triumphant version of events: "I did everything I
could. I went several times to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense
Committee and submitted reports to the chief of staff. Nowhere did I say
that I accepted the conspiracy theory that Oslo was a plot to eliminate
Israel. To my regret, [current Defense Minister and then chief of staff
Shaul] Mofaz and Bogey [Moshe Ya'alon, now Chief of Staff] as his deputy
ignored what I said. What Gilad said suited them better, and therefore
they adopted it."
Malka notes that Gilad was "a very significant factor who influenced
many people. Thanks to his rhetoric - and in a situation in which no one
in the cabinet reads intelligence material, apart from the defense
minister and the foreign minister, a little - the ministers are carried
away by professional lecturers, who put the word `I' into 50 percent of
their text."
Malka challenges Gilad's professional integrity: "I say, with full
responsibility, that during my entire period as head of Military
Intelligence, there was not a single research department document that
expressed the assessment that Gilad claims to have presented to the
prime minister. As obligatory under the work regulations, no document
can leave the research department without getting the approval of the
head of the division. Therefore it is not possible that Gilad's written
opinion was the opposite of those dealing with the Palestinian arena. If
there was a difference between the assessments, there is no other
definition of this but conspiracy. But because Gilad is endowed with a
great awareness of history, it cannot also be assumed that the
conception he transmitted orally was different from the one that the
division formulated in writing. Therefore I argue that only after the
Taba talks were broken off, on the eve of the 2001 elections, Gilad
began retroactively rewriting MI's assessments."
Lavie refuses to relate to the disagreement between the two schools of
thought and confines himself to a brief response: "My detailed position
on the Palestinian issue is well known to the past and present heads of
MI. I believe that it is impossible to ignore Malka's claims, and it is
essential to examine the validity of the existing conception in their
light."
Gilad - whose good relations with Malka cooled following the
professional disagreement - is not impressed by the versions put forth
by Malka and Lavie. "I would have no problem if 1,000 people thought
differently than I. That still doesn't mean that they're right. It's a
lie that I didn't voice different assessments. I made sure to bring the
head of the department [dealing with the Palestinians] and the head of
the branch to discussions with the head of MI. I insist that I have
always said what I'm saying now and have been saying all along."
In the background, there is also a disagreement between Gilad and Arab
affairs specialist Mati Steinberg, whose view concurs with that of Malka
and Lavie. In the past, Gilad spread a crude letter against Steinberg
following a disagreement over Palestinian textbooks, and even complained
that Barak had ignored it and preferred to meet alone with Steinberg
numerous times. Steinberg, for his part, asserts that he has never met
with Barak one-on-one.
Gilad was also prepared to comment on the doubts that have surfaced
recently with respect to the influence of the state of his health on the
quality of his assessments, after he sued the Defense Ministry to obtain
a high disability rating because of phenomena resulting from
psychological pressure.
Gilad relates that during the Lebanon War, as a major in MI, he warned
GOC Northern Command Amir Drori not to let the Phalangist forces enter
the Sabra and Chatila refugee camps. After he heard about the slaughter
over the operational radio, he hastened to report the incident to the MI
control center. Several days later, he was reprimanded for having used
the intelligence network for operational reporting that was not within
his area of authority. According to Gilad, the heavy pressure he was
under affected him badly and a short time thereafter he came down with
diabetes. The doctors told him that psychological pressure can cause
diabetes, and upon his demobilization from the Israel Defense Forces
they advised him to see to medical coverage from the Defense Ministry -
and he did so, as has been reported recently.
Even after his demobilization, Gilad continues to sit close to the
junctures of security and diplomatic decision-making and to influence
the leadership with the same decisiveness and conviction, although today
too his views are not supported by the professional echelon of MI.
***
A week of increasing debate
[To get an impression of what kind of things come up in the discussion started by
the Eldar article (in what continues to be only a beginning of opening up) here
follow excerpts of what Ben Caspit wrote for Maariv June 6 and June 13 (with thanks to
the UK friends) and the article of Danny Rubinstein in today's weekend supplement]
<http://www.jfjfp.org/maariv_caspit.htm>
<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/439571.html>
Haaretz June 18 - Arafat interview by David Landau & Akiva Eldar
A Jewish state? `Definitely'
By David Landau and Akiva Eldar
Arafat is ready to sign an agreement that would give Palestinians 97 per
cent of the West Bank and Gaza - with the rest in a land swap, and the
right of return of not all, but at least some refugees. In a free-
ranging interview with Haaretz, conducted in the carefully preserved
ruins of the Muqata, the PA Chairman also spoke of the historical family
bonds between the two peoples.
Full text:
English
<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/440479.html>
òáøéú/Hebrew
<http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=440679>
# Photos + report of June 16 A-Ram protest against the Wall
The press conference + start of women's demo
http://www.gush-shalom.org
http://www.gush-shalom.org/english/index.html
Photos of the following women's protest march
http://share.shutterfly.com/os.jsp?i=EeANWjlw2csWzqg&open=1
# The "Breaking the Silence" soldiers' exhibition continues in Tel Aviv (until June
25th) link for details [in Hebrew only] : http://www.shovrimshtika.org/hebrew/
and in English: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/440348.html
# Arna's Children June schedule at:
http://www.arna.info/Arna/movie.php?lang=heb
# Truth against Truth - opposite views on the history of the conflict
in 101 steps
# Video footage of mass uprooting of olive trees
and the women's resistance in Az Zawiya, June 7
(all of it for the construction of the monster Wall)
available at:
http://www.womenspeacepalestine.org/news8junazzawiya.htm
(International Womens' Peace Service - IWPS)
# Palestinians draw the map for understanding the Disengagement Plan
http://www.nad-plo.org/images/maps/pdf/gaza.pdf
Hebrew / òáøéú
http://www.gush-shalom.org/Docs/Truth_Heb.pdf
English
http://www.gush-shalom.org/Docs/Truth_Eng.pdf
# Boycott List of Settlement Products (newly updated)
Hebrew / òáøéú
http://gush-shalom.org/Boycott/boycheb.htm
English
http://gush-shalom.org/Boycott/boyceng.htm
# Refusniks
Constantly-updated refusniks lists:
English - http://www.yesh-gvul.org/english/prison/
Hebrew / òáøéú - http://www.yesh-gvul.org/prison/
English - http://www.newprofile.org/default.asp?language=en
Hebrew / òáøéú - http://www.newprofile.org/
Help us free our children from the military prison! (parents of The Five)
For ENGLISH details please click http://www.refuz.org.il/help.html
For HEBREW please click http://www.refuz.org.il/hebrew/help.html
Homepage with lots of information:
http://www.refuz.org.il/
# Eye-witness reports from the Occupied Territories:
http://www.machsomwatch.org
(Israeli women monitoring the checkpoints)
http://www.palsolidarity.org/pressreleases/pressreleases.php
(internationals throughout OT)
--
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http://www.gush-shalom.org/english/index.html (English)
http://www.gush-shalom.org/arabic/index.html (selected articles in Arabic)
with
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Please, add your email address where to send our
confirmation of receipt. More official receipts at
request only.
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