[GushShalomBillboard] Verdict in deportation case + more
Gush Shalom (Israeli Peace Bloc)
info at gush-shalom.org
Mon Jul 15 16:40:45 IDT 2002
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// Gush Shalom Billboard //
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[This billboard contains announcements and articles of ourselves and others.]
announcements
[1] Tomorrow, Tuesday, verdict in deportation case
Request to come and/or send faxes
[2] Friday - CWJP Seminar
[3] Withdrawal of the racist bill - modest victory in a gloomy period
including Gush Shalom's ad
[4] Two pieces from Ha'aretz July 14, illustrating media bias
(a) Gush Shalom not mentioned but our information about A-Ram DID make it into Ha'aretz
(b) Yesh Gvul benefit concert visited by a thousand mostly young but Ha'aretz: "Poor turnout"
comment and analysis
[5] Camp David Revisited - Avnery reveals what Barak tries to conceal
[6] Haim Baram: Labour’s "Final Flourish"
[1] Tomorrow, Tuesday, verdict in deportation case
Request to come and/or send faxes
------- Forwarded message follows -------
From: " Shamai Leibowitz" <shamai at leibowitz.co.il>
Subject: deportation case
In small courtrooms in Israel, using the facade of a "legal process",
Israel has started the deportations of Palestinians from the West Bank.
For those who are not aware of the case, here is a short summary:
The Israeli government, supported by the Israeli judges, are going to
forcibly deport two innocent Palestinians from the West Bank and into
Jordan.
The two Palestinians, who live in the West Bank, are Maher Diuk and Magdi
Nagar.
Mr. Diuk has lived in Abwein, a suburb of Ramallah. He is married to Aida
Diuk, who is 7- months pregnant. Because he also holds Jordanian
citizenship, the Israeli government wants to deport him to Jordan (Effi
Eitam – you can take a vacation).
Mr. Nagar is a Palestinian citizen living in the West Bank city of Beit
Sahur (near Bethlehem). He has lived there for seven years. Because he also
holds a Jordanian passport (as do many thousands of Palestinians) the
Israeli authorities issued an order of deportation to Jordan.
They both filed petitions to the Jerusalem District Court. They might as
well have filed petitions to FIFA. The court, ofcourse, denied their
petitions. Attorney Leibowitz appealed to the Supreme Court, but the
Israeli Supreme Court did not intervene. In a hearing which lasted 5
minutes, during which the judges were writing other verdicts, they rejected
the appeal and justified the State's actions. The judge who wrote the
two-sentence decision was Shlomo Levin.
Remember that name.
How could Jewish judges do unto others what was done to their ancestors
during the past two thousand years? The answer might be found in the fact
that during both hearings, in the Jerusalem District Court and in the
Supreme Court, the courtroom was empty. That gave the judges the freedom
they needed to authorize such iniquitous acts. They knew there won't be a
public outcry.
Attoney Leibowitz filed another petition to the District Court in Tel
Aviv. Judge Oded Modrik heard oral arguments on July 8. This time there was
a small crowd of about 10 people. This time, Judge Modrik did not
immediately reject the appeal but said he needs a few days to think about
it. He will render his decision on July 16 at 08:30.
These two men did not commit any crime. They are not our enemies. Let us
not turn them into our enemies by committing an outrageous act of
deportation, tearing them away from their families and property.
Come and show solidarity with these two people on Tuesday July 16, at 8:30,
in the District Court in Tel Aviv, 1 Weissman St., 3rd floor, Judge
Modrik's Courtroom. Please mark your calendars and tell your friends about
it.
Anyone wishing to receive a transcript of the proceedings, can call
Attorney Leibowitz 972-3-5327772.
If you wish to let the Israeli authorities know your opinion about their
actions, fax Judge Shlomo Levin in the Supreme Court: 972-2-6759744 re:
appeal no. 4707/02
or Jerusalem District Attorney, Mr. Moshe Lador, fax no: 972-2-6258408
or Tel Aviv District Attorney, Mr. Yaakov Cohen, fax no: 972-3-6918541
Shamai Leibowitz, Esq
Ben Gurion St 11A
Givat Shmuel ISRAEL 54017
Tel: 972-3-5327772
---------------------------------------------
I would agree with St. Augustine that "an unjust
law is no law at all" - martin luther king jr
[2] Friday - CWJP Seminar
-----Original Message-----
From: Gila Svirsky [mailto:gsvirsky at netvision.net.il]
Sent: Monday, July 15, 2002 9:19 AM
The Coalition of Women for Peace is sponsoring...
Between Despair and Hope: Analyses and Forecasts
This Friday, 19 July 2002, at the Ramat Aviv Hotel
[first of a series of events]
9:30 Arrival and coffee.
10:00 - 12:30 The Social and Economic Situation in Israel
The impact of the conflict on social and economic issues; assessments, trends, and foreca
sts for
the coming two years.
Ilana Bakal, Ahoti: Advancement of Working Women in Israel
Amin Fares, Mossawa: Advocacy Center for Palestinian Citizens of Israel
Daphna Levit, Departmentof Business Administration, Ben- Gurion University
Shlomo Swirski, Adva Center for Equality and Social Justice
Moderator: Debby Lerman
12:30 - 14:00 Light lunch and Women in Black vigil
14:30 - 17:30 Palestinian Citizens of Israel
The status and attitudes of Palestinian citizens of Israel in the face of intensifying disc
rimination.
Assessments and forecasts for the coming two years.
Majid al-Atawna, School of Social Work, Bar-Ilan University
Azmi Bishara, Balad Party.
Aida Touma-Sliman, Hadash Party.
Moderator: Fatahia Zreyer
Participants are asked to contribute NIS 20-50 to cover expenses (sliding scale).
For more information: Gila (053) 334 986 or Dita (052) 439 009.
[3] Withdrawal of the racist bill - modest victory in a gloomy period
Yesterday, the Sharon Government backtacked on its earlier support for a bill
which would have made it legal to establish offcially Jews-only communities
on state lands. The bill aroused an enormous wave of protests in the
Israeli media and political system, even from unexpected quarters such as
Biyamin Begin, son of the late PM whose positions on most issues are extreme-
right. This is a welcome break after months in which it seemed that in today's
Israel any nationalist or xenophobic or anti-democratic measure can be assured
of success - whether directed against the Palestinians, Israel's own Arab
citizens, the migrant workers in the Tel-Aviv slums or the media.
At the same time, it should be remembered that many of the critics of Jews-only bill were not objec
ting
to segregation and discrimination as such - indeed, the creation
and maintenance of Jews-only communities is a fundamental fact of Israeli
life since the state was established - but only to the practice being codified
in explicit legislation. In quite a few infuriating articles and commentaries
it was argued that the bill was "not needed" because the dicriminatory practices
could be continued by less explicit bureacratic procedures, and that
even the Supreme Court's verdict of 2000, declaring the practice illegal, could
be (and had been, for the past two years) circumvented. Many of the critics were not so much worrie
d
about the immorality of the bill as such as about the propaganda damage to Israel from its passage,
which would have amountted to a retroactive confirmation of the (later retracted) UN resolution dec
laring
Zionism to be racist.
But whatever the motives, the fact is that as a result of a public campaign, a particularly obnoxio
us piece
of legislation will not enter the Israeli law books. In the highly gloomy general situation, it is
important to
know that this is still possible.
Adam Keller - Gush Shalom spokesperson
[follows the Gush Shalom ad of last Friday]:
WHAT IS HAPPENING TO OUR STATE?
The occupation does not stop at the Green Line. It flows into Israel proper. It corrupts the state
and
causes its institutions to rot.
This week, the government has given its blessing to a draft-law, according to which 20 percent of t
he
citizens of Israel – the Arabs – have no right to live where they want to live and have no share of
state-
owned lands and new townships. All these are reserved for Jews only.
Most ministers voted for this law. The Labor party ministers absented themselves with pitiful prete
xts.
This law will turn Israel officially into an apartheid state. Israel-haters all over the world will
rejoice. Decent
Israelis will be ashamed.
ad published in Ha'aretz, July 12, 2002.
Help us with donations to
Gush Shalom P.O.Box 3322, Tel-Aviv 61033,
[4] Two pieces from Ha'aretz July 14, illustrating media bias
(a) Gush Shalom not mentioned but our information about A-Ram DID make it into Ha'aretz
(b) Yesh Gvul benefit concert visited by a thousand mostly young but Ha'aretz: "Poor turnout"
It is difficult these days to get our kind of information into the Israeli media. and even if picke
d up
the editors tend to downplay.
Two examples from today's Ha'aretz (the other papers are worse):
(a) Gush Shalom not mentioned but our information about A-Ram DID make it into Ha'aretz
In A-Ram, the garbage is piling up
By Ha'aretz Staff
While Israel's stated policy is non-intervention in the civilian aspects of life in the Palestinian
Authority, things look somewhat different from the Palestinian perspective.
In the A-Ram neighborhood north of Jerusalem, the Israel Defense Forces impounded three
garbage trucks and two bulldozers, so that garbage has been mounting in the streets for a week
now. Mayor Ra'ed Barghouti was informed by the Israeli Civil Administration that if he makes
contact with a certain official in the administration, the matter would soon be resolved. Barghouti
,
however, is unwilling to cooperate with the administration, which is perceived as bypassing the
Palestinian Authority. The administration should not talk to him but to the relevant Palestinian
minister, he says.
Most traffic to and from Ramallah has to pass through the Qalandiyah checkpoint north of
Jerusalem. Because of the meticulous security checks, average waiting time is three hours. The
IDF says all vehicles must be carefully inspected - but this does not explain why the number of
inspectors could not be boosted to speed up the process.
Palestinian businesses that buy their materials in the territories themselves are not much better
off. The owner of a wood factory in Bethlehem told Ha'aretz yesterday that his plant has been
closed for a long time now. "I have many orders waiting from the U.S., I have the machinery and I
have workers eager to work. The problem is that I get my raw materials from Jenin, and now it's
virtually impossible to get a truck with goods from Jenin to Bethlehem. I have laid off 30 workers
and the plant is closed," he said.
In Nablus the mayor circulated a petition signed by many residents, calling for international aid
because of the long curfew that has completely paralyzed the economy of this city, the richest and
most industrialized in the West Bank.
According to Palestinian sources, Israel plans to implement the Karni model in the West Bank as
well. At the Karni passage that connects between the Gaza Strip in Israel, trucks unload back-to-
back; Israeli vehicles do not enter Palestinian territory and Palestinian trucks do not exit it. Th
is
method is already used in the Beitunya area, west of Ramallah.
(b) Yesh Gvul benefit concert visited by a thousand mostly young but Ha'aretz: "Poor turnout"
Poor turnout at Yesh Gvul rally
Only 1,000 people attended the happening organized on Friday evening in Tel Aviv by Yesh
Gvul ("there is a limit"), a movement that supports soldiers who refuse assignments in the
Territories.
"Granted, we were expecting a bigger turnout, but artists have canceled their performances
because they were threatened. There were violent threats as well. In all, it was a fun event,"
spokesman Yishai Menuchin said. Yesh Gvul says that various organizations, like the national
students' union, pressured some of the artists not to perform. It is not clear yet whether the
revenues will even cover the costs. Whatever is left will be used to support soldiers who were
imprisoned because they refused to serve in the territories, Menuchin said. (Yam Yehoshua)
[5] Camp David Revisited - Avnery reveals what Barak tries to conceal
["Uri Avnery examines the interview conducted in the New York Review of Books of Ehud Barak by form
er
"new historian" now turned pro-government zealot, Benny Morris.
Avnery examines the implications of many of Barak's statements, as well as the points that the
substance of Barak's words conceal" (M. Plitnick in Jewish Peace News).
The original interview may be read in full, along with a more fully informed description of what h
appened
at Camp David in 2000 by Robert Malley and Hussein Agha at
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/JewishPeaceNews/message/1860 ]
Uri Avnery:
July 2002
Barak: A Villa in the Jungle
A well-known Israeli theatre critic once left the opening performance of a new play after the
first five
minutes and then wrote a withering review about it. When his colleagues said that this was unfair,
he
answered: "I don't have to eat the whole egg in order to know that it is rotten."
One does not have to read the whole long interview with Ehud Barak, published in The New York
Review of Books (June 13, 2002), in order to know that he is - well, not exactly an enlightened
statesman. It is enough to read the following words of his:
"They (the Palestinians, and especially Arafat) are the products of a culture in which to tel
l a
lie...creates no dissonance. They don't suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Jude
o-
Christian culture. Truth is seen as an irrelevant category...The deputy director of the US Federal
Bureau
of Investigation told me that there are societies in which lie detector tests don't work, societies
in which
lies do not create cognitive dissonance (on which the tests are based)."
This passage speaks volumes.
First of all, the Israeli security services do use lie detectors extensively in the interrogat
ion of
Palestinian militants. But it is useless to examine facts, because the statement itself is monstrou
s. At
one fell swoop, the Great Peace-Maker demonizes the culture of a billion living human beings as wel
l as
of 50 generations, a culture which in its heyday bequeathed humanity some of its greatest scientifi
c and
philosophical achievements.
The stereotyping of a whole culture, people, society or race is despicable. It lies at the bas
e of anti-
Semitism. It is obnoxious coming from any politician, but when voiced by a politician trying to exp
lain
why he failed to make peace with these "products of a culture" it makes further study seem superflu
ous.
It's all there, the whole rotten egg. However, we shall persevere.
By condemning Islam and identifying himself with Judeo-Christianity (a dubious concept in itse
lf,
since Judaism is closer to Islam than to Christianity), Barak is trying to ride the wave of Islamop
hobia
that is currently sweeping the US and the whole Western world. It reminds one of the words written
some
108 years ago by Theodor Herzl, the father of modern Zionism, in his book "Der Judenstaat", the fou
nding
document of Zionism: "For Europe we would constitute (in Palestine) a part of the wall against Asia
, we
would serve as an outpost of Culture against Barbarism."
By asserting that all Arabs lie at all times, Barak also constructs a beautiful defense. Whate
ver the
Palestinians say to disprove his account can be dismissed in advance. They always lie, don't they?
Obviously feeling himself that such a sweeping statement needs some corroboration, Barak provide
s
an anecdote: At some meeting, Arafat agreed to tell his police commanders to implement a truce...
"I interjected: "But these are not the people organizing the violence. If you are serious, the
n call
Marwan Barghouri and Hussein al-Sheikh" (the West Bank Fatah leaders). Arafat looked at me, with an
expression of blank innocence, as if I had mentioned the names of two polar bears, and said: "Who?
Who?" I repeated the names...and Arafat again said "Who? Who?" At this, some of his aides couldn't
stop themselves and burst out laughing. And Arafat, forced to drop the pretense, agreed to call the
m
later."
Anybody who knows Arafat can reconstruct the scene easily. It is typical Arafat humor, designe
d to
evoke laughter, as indeed it did. It was also designed to make a political point - both persons men
tioned
are prominent leaders, known by everyone to be close to Arafat, who is also their party chief. In a
way
understandable to every Arab, Arafat was refusing to acknowledge their responsibility. By taking th
e joke
at face value, Barak - himself a humorless person - shows his complete ignorance of Arab discourse.
This monumental ignorance, coupled with monumental arrogance, created the mixture that turned
Barak into the most disastrous prime minister in Israel's history, surpassing even Golda Meir.
x x x
Before going into the details of the interview, one has to mention the interviewer. He is Benn
y Morris,
the former "new historian", who in one easy jump has turned from the idol of the left into the darl
ing of the
right, redeeming himself from the stigma of being a "post-Zionist".
It was a clever choice on Barak's part. Morris conducts the interview as a sycophantic devotee
,
accepting unquestioningly Barak's most hair-raising statements (such as the above) and refraining f
rom
asking any embarrassing questions, obvious as they might appear.
Morris has been accused in the past of being a "revisionist" of Zionist history, because of hi
s book
revealing how the Palestinian refugees were driven out in 1948. It is rather hilarious to perceive
how, in
this interview, he freely levels the accusation of "revisionism" at anyone who dares to doubt Barak
's
assertions.
Barak does not expose himself to the questioning of a real, investigative journalist, like Deb
orah
Sontag of The New York Times, nor does he confront an objective eye-witness, like Robert Malley,
President Clinton's assistant at Camp David. These are two of the "revisionists" who evoked the ire
of the
Barak-Morris team, as well as that of Clinton, who - Barak recounts - called him in Sardinia to rav
e at
Sontag's excellent and well-researched article about Camp David. "What the hell is this?" Clinton
demanded, according to Barak.
x x x
Let's turn now to the interview itself.
According to Morris (who, of course, was not at Camp David and relies on what Barak told him),
on
July 18, in the middle of the conference, Clinton read to Arafat "a document, endorsed in advance b
y
Barak..."
Let's stop right here. What does this mean? How come the President of the United States, the
honest broker, reaches advance agreement with one side, before even presenting a proposal to the
other? Does this not prove that the Palestinians were quite right when they asserted, at the time,
that
this was in fact Barak's proposal, wrapped by Clinton in the American flag?
As may be remembered, Arafat did not want to go to Camp David at all. He was afraid that he
would
be faced there with Clinton and Barak acting like the two arms of a nutcracker. (At the time, I mys
elf
used this metaphor.) He had very little trust in Barak, since the Prime Minister had already broken
Israel's commitment under the Oslo agreements to implement the third stage of its withdrawal from t
he
West Bank, freeing all the territory except "specified military locations".
To reinforce his arguments against a summit conference, Arafat protested that there had been n
o
preparatory work on the issues, as usual before summit conferences. Since Barak insisted, Clinton
overcame Arafat's objections by promising that, in the case of failure, neither of the parties woul
d be
blamed.
After the conference, Clinton cynically broke his promise and blamed Arafat exclusively - in o
rder, as
he later explained, to help Barak get re-elected (and, one may add, to help his long-suffering wife
to win
votes in the biggest Jewish city in the world.)
On this point Morris writes:
"As to the charge raised by the Palestinians, and in their wake, by Deborah Sontag, and Malley
and
Agha, that the Palestinians had been dragooned into coming to Camp David 'unprepared' and
prematurely, Barak is dismissive to the point of contempt. He observes that the Palestinians had ei
ght
years, since 1993' to prepare their positions..."
This is Barak-style obfuscation at its best (or worst). The "charge", of course, is not that t
he
Palestinians had no time to prepare their positions. In an interview on Israeli television, Barak a
sserted
that he did not need to prepare himself, since he "knew every hill" on the West Bank. The "charge"
is
that there had been no preparatory work done by joint committees to reach agreement on as many
issues as possible and to demarcate the lines of disagreement where this was not possible, so that
the
leaders could grapple with the remaining bones of contention. This is the usual procedure at summit
meetings.
The phrase "Barak is dismissive to the point of contempt" is highly indicative of the man. It'
s all there:
the overbearing arrogance, the conviction that the other side is vastly inferior, that their argume
nts need
not be answered but can be "dismissed".
x x x
So what was Barak's proposal, as read out "slowly" to Arafat by Clinton? According to Morris,
it
included:
The establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state on 92% of the West Bank and 100% of the
Gaza Strip;
Some territorial compensation for the Palestinians from the pre-1967 Israeli territory;
Annexation of 8% of the West Bank to Israel;
Dismantling of most of the settlements and the concentration of the bulk of the settlers in th
e 8% to
be annexed;
The establishment of the Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem,
Some Arab neighborhood in East Jerusalem to become sovereign Palestinian territories and other
s to
enjoy "functional autonomy";
Palestinian sovereignty over half of the Old City of Jerusalem (the Muslim and Christian quart
ers, but
not the Armenian and Jewish quarters);
"Custodianship," though not sovereignty, over the Temple Mount;
A return of the refugees to the prospective Palestinian state, with no "right of return" to Is
rael proper;
A massive aid program to facilitate the refugees' rehabilitation.
It must be admitted that these proposals of Barak's, disguised as American, do indeed go furth
er than
any made by previous Israeli prime ministers. One cannot blame Barak, being quite ignorant of
Palestinian affairs, for considering them extremely generous. However, in fact, they fall far short
of the
minimum Palestinian requirements.
Morris' description does not give a full picture. Some salient facts are obscured. For example
:
The figure of 92 percent is highly debatable. It does not include the annexed territories of E
ast
Jerusalem, which had by then become Israeli neighborhoods, nor the Jordan valley, which Israel insi
sted
on keeping under its control for some considerable time, cutting Palestine off from neighboring Jor
dan.
Palestinians may be excused for doubting that Israel will in the future relinquish territories it k
eeps
"temporarily" under its control. Altogether, Palestinians believed that the real proposed annexatio
n was
closer to 20 percent. One has to remember, of course, that the whole West Bank and Gaza Strip
amounts only to 22 percent of the land of Palestine, as it existed in 1947. (78 percent was conquer
ed by
the Israeli army in 1948 and became Israel.)
It is not only a question of percentages, but also of location. The "settlement blocs" that B
arak
wanted to annex to Israel are like daggers tearing into the flesh of the future Palestinian state,
cutting it
up into what could easily be turned into disconnected enclaves.
Territorial compensations were not to be on a 1-to-1 basis, as demanded by the Palestinians, b
ut
something like 1-to-9.
The Arab parts of East Jerusalem which Barak agreed to transfer to Palestinian sovereignty wer
e
outlying suburbs (like Shuafat and Beith Hanina), while the central Arab neighborhoods (like Sheikh
-
Jarakh, Silwan and Ras-al-Amud) were accorded only "functional autonomy" under Israeli sovereignty.
This was totally unacceptable.
Worse, the Palestinians were granted only "guardianship" over the compound of the holy mosques
(Haram ash-Sharif, the Noble Sanctuary, in Arabic and Har ha-Bayit, the Temple Mount, in Hebrew),
which meant that Israel would retain sovereignty. No leader in the Arab world could have accepted t
hat.
Palestinians could possibly have agreed to the annexation of the Jewish quarter of the Old Cit
y,
including the Western Wall, to Israel. Annexation of the Armenian quarter, which is closely connect
ed to
the Christian quarter, is something else.
Barak's insistence that "not one single refugee" could return to Israel proper is totally unac
ceptable to
the Palestinians, both symbolically and practically.
Morris does not mention in this connection the most important part of the proposal: that the
Palestinians formally agree that this would be "the end of the conflict". Barak's proposal might pe
rhaps
have been acceptable as another interim agreement - but it was quite impossible for the Palestinian
s to
accept it, and especially the parts concerning the Temple Mount and the refugees, as "the final
settlement".
As Morris, who was not there, described it graphically:
"Arafat said 'No.' Clinton, enraged, banged on the table..."
x x x
If Barak had been compelled to face some real investigative journalist, instead of a devotee d
isguised
as a historian, he would have been cross-examined about his own frame of mind. What did he think of
the Palestinians when he came to power? Did he have any preconceived ideas, any prejudices that mig
ht
have influenced his way of thinking?
Barak himself, in domestic discussions, often used a telling metaphor: Israel is "a villa in t
he middle
of a jungle". Meaning: we are an island of civilization surrounded by savage animals. This is remar
kably
similar to old-established colonial attitudes, and, indeed, a variation of Herzl's metaphor of the
"wall
against barbarism".
In his mind, Barak had a picture of the devious Arafat, forever plotting the overthrow of Isra
el. This, by
the way, is a standard Israeli concept which has deep psychological roots. It may stem, partly, fro
m
unconscious guilt: we have driven half the Palestinian people from their homes, how can they ever r
eally
accept us and make peace with us? According to Barak, quoted by Morris, Arafat was:
"Secretly planning Israel's demise...What they [Arafat and his colleagues] want is a Palestin
ian state
in all of Palestine...They are willing to agree to a temporary truce...Arafat sees himself as a reb
orn
Saladin...(Arafat believes) that Israel has no right to exist, and he seeks it's demise..."
Needless to say, there is not a shred of evidence for any of this. It says nothing about Araf
at, but it
says a lot about Barak. The famous general, the brilliant thinker (as he sees himself), is repeatin
g the
most hackneyed of stereotypes resorted to by the proverbial vendor of pickled cucumbers in an Israe
li
market.
He even sets forth the way Arafat thinks Israel will disappear as a Jewish state: first Israel
will turn
into a "state of all its citizens" (a basic democratic concept, based on the American constitution,
supported by quite a number of liberal Jewish Israelis), then there will be a "Muslim majority", th
en the
destruction of Israel as a Jewish state. As these are all domestic Israeli issues, it is not quite
clear what
they have to do with Arafat, Camp David and Israeli-Palestinian relations.
An old Israeli myth, code-named "the plan of stages", alleges that the Palestinians believe in
"Salami
tactics" - accepting what they can get at any stage and then demanding more, until the Jewish state
is
destroyed. Barak repeats this. Morris:
"Barak today portrays Arafat's behavior at Camp David as a "performance" geared to exacting fr
om
the Israelis as many concessions as possible without ever seriously intending to reach a peace
settlement or sign an "end to the conflict".
This is strange. If Arafat (like every Arab) is indeed a "serial liar", as Barak alleges, why
for God's
sake did he not accept the proposal? The logical thing for him to do would have been to agree to al
l the
wonderful concessions Barak was ready to make, sign everything demanded and then, after a few years
,
come back and demand more.
Imprisoned by their own prejudices, Barak and Morris do not even see the contradiction. Indeed
,
Arafat's behavior at Camp David, his stubborn refusal to sign an agreement that did not meet his
minimum demands, proves once and for all that "the plan of stages" is utter nonsense.
* * *
Barak and Morris say that Arafat "kept saying 'no' to every offer, never making any counterpro
posals
of his own." The record does not bear this out.
While it is true that Arafat, coming to Camp David against his will, was in a defensive mood,
ready to
withstand the double onslaught of Barak and Clinton, he made concessions that were very far-reachin
g
from the Palestinian point of view. The fact that Israelis and Americans took these in their stride
, hardly
even noticing them, only shows the immense gap between the perceptions of the parties. Palestinian
propaganda could not have bragged about these concessions either, since they were inimical to the
wishes of many Palestinians.
As a matter of fact, Arafat made the following explicit and implicit concessions at Camp David
, and
later at Taba:
- He agreed to change the almost sacred Green Line by accepting the
principle of land swaps;
- He accepted the concept of settlement blocs, which is anathema to all Pale
stinians;
- He ceded the Jewish neighborhoods built on Arab land in East Jerusalem, breaking anothe
r
Palestinian taboo;
- He was ready to give up the Wailing Wall and the Jewish quarter of the Jerusalem Old City, which
were
parts of Arab East Jerusalem before 1967.
- He indicated his readiness to reach a compromise on the Right of Return, sacred to all Palestini
ans,
by accepting that the implementation should be subject to Israeli agreement.
Barak ignores all these. According to Morris, he charged
"Arafat with 'lacking the character or will' to make a historic compromise, as did the late Eg
yptian
President, Anwar Sadat in 1977-1979, when he made peace with Israel..."
Barak would have been well advised to drop this comparison. Sadat got all his territory back,
to the
very last centimeter. Arafat would have easily agreed to the same terms - as would have Assad.
* * *
Barak, so it seems, is furious with Arafat because the Palestinian leader denies Zionist axiom
s,
indeed, because Arafat is not an orthodox Zionist like himself.
"(Arafat) does not recognize the existence of a Jewish people or nation, only a Jewish religio
n...This,
Barak believes, underlay Arafat's insistence at Camp David (and since) that the Palestinians have
sole
sovereignty over the Temple Mount compound...Arafat refused to accept even the vague formulation
proposed by Clinton (in December 2000) positing Israeli sovereignty over the earth beneath the Temp
le
Mount's surface area."
Arafat could easily turn the tables and claim that Barak does not recognize Islam by denying
Palestinian sovereignty over the holy Islamic shrines on the mount. As a matter of fact, Barak,
obfuscating to the last, offered "guardianship" - but not sovereignty - over the mosques. His abysm
al
ignorance of Islamic affairs made it impossible for him to comprehend that no Muslim leader in the
world
could possibly agree to this. If Arafat had agreed, he would have turned himself into a mortal enem
y of
every devout Muslim.
The quaint demand for Israeli sovereignty "beneath the surface" - a diplomatic curiosity, for
sure - was
the brainchild of Yossi Beilin and Shlomo Ben-Ami, two minions of Barak at the time. Far from evoki
ng
laughter from the Palestinians, it caused panic among many of them. Being by then convinced that th
e
Israelis had secret designs in everything they proposed, they believed that the Israelis intended t
o dig
beneath the mosques in order to bare the remnants of their ancient temple, thus causing the mosques
to
collapse. They may be excused for believing this, because some years ago an armed Israeli terrorist
organization indeed planned to bomb the mosques.
Arafat countered by claiming that "there is nothing there", enraging Barak and even Clinton, w
ho
responded that "not only the Jews but I, too, believe that under the surface there are remains of
Solomon's temple." Clinton may not be aware of the fact that most contemporary (non-Jewish) experts
believe that Solomon was not a historical figure and that the first Judean temple on the site was n
othing
more than an insignificant local structure. In any case, if there are remains, they would not be of
"Solomon's temple", but of the building erected by King Herod nearly a millennium later.
Be that as it may, this whole intermezzo shows the utter lack of seriousness of the Camp David
discussions.
* * *
Morris, the ex-revisionist historian, asserts that
"One senses that Barak feels on less firm ground when he responds to the 'revisionist' charge
that it
was the continued Israeli settlement in the Occupied Territories during the year before Camp David
and
under his premiership, that had so stirred Palestinian passions as to make the intifada inevitable.
"
This is an understatement. The fact is that furious settlement activity continued unabated all
through
the weeks Barak was talking about peace at Camp David. When asked to explain this, Barak says:
"Immediately after I took office I promised Arafat: No new settlements - but I also told him
that we
would continue to honor the previous government's commitments and contracts in the pipeline,
concerning the expansion of existing settlements..."
This is vintage Barak. With his parliamentary majority, he could have easily passed a law ter
minating
all contracts, with fair compensations. There was talk of this at the time. "Existing commitments"
served
as a pretext for the ongoing activity all over the territories, which every Palestinian saw daily w
ith his own
eyes. It helped to convince the settlers that Barak did not intend to really give back any territor
y - in fact,
the settlers kept ominously quiet while news from Camp David seemed to foreshadow an agreement
providing for the evacuation of dozens of settlements. It seems that they knew better.
Understandably, the Palestinians were far more impressed by the action on the ground than by t
he
diplomatic double-talk. They saw the new settlements springing up and the new by-pass roads cutting
through their land, and were not deceived by the fact that they were always disguised as "extension
s" of
existing ones. (I myself have taken part in a demonstration in front of Barak's private home in Koc
hav
Ya'ir, hard on the Green Line, protesting against a new settlement disguised this way going up just
a few
miles away.)
Palestinians also noticed that the new settlements followed a plan cutting their territories to
pieces.
Barak denies this:
"I ask myself why he [Arafat} is lying. To put it simply, any proposal that offers 92 percent
of the
West Bank cannot, almost by definition, break up the territory into noncontiguous cantons..."
This is simply not true. And, indeed, Barak hastens to correct:
"...except for a razor-thin Israeli wedge running from Jerusalem thorough Maaleh Adumim to the
Jordan River. Here, Palestinian territorial continuity would have been assured by a tunnel or bridg
e."
All the "settlement blocs" were planned in advance - mostly by Ariel Sharon - precisely for th
is
purpose: to create several such wedges, secured by settlements, by-pass-roads and army installation
s.
Their effectiveness is being proved these days by the operations of the Israel Defense Forces. Base
d on
the settlements, the army cuts the Palestinian territories into ribbons, creating disconnected cant
ons
everywhere.
An effective wedge does not have to go all the way from the Green Line to the Jordan river in
order to
create cantons or "Bantustans". Three-quarters, or even half the way is enough to allow the Israeli
army
to complete the wedge within minutes. Such a situation would leave all the Palestinian territory at
the
mercy of the Israeli army at all times.
One salient fact overshadows this dispute: at no time at Camp David did Barak produce a map of
his
famous "92 percent". No such official map exists to this very day.
Why?
* * *
Camp David was not the end. Both Clinton and Barak shifted their positions a lot during the fo
llowing
months. In December 2000, Clinton made another proposal that came much closer to the Palestinian
position, and in January 2001, at Taba, Barak's emissaries, too, moved forward a great deal.
However, a lot of things had changed in the meantime. The failure of Camp David created an ups
urge
of rage and frustration on the Palestinian side, leading to the almost unanimous popular conclusion
that
"the Israelis understand only the language of force". (This, by the way, is precisely what the Isra
elis say
about the Palestinians - "they only understand force".) Following Israel's unilateral withdrawal fr
om
Lebanon, seen by many in the Arab world as an Arab military victory, this mood led to the outbreak
of
the second Intifada.
The immediate cause - the match thrown into the barrel of oil - was Sharon's visit to the comp
ound of
the mosques on the Temple Mount. This "visit" was approved by Barak. His police minister, Shlomo Be
n-
Ami (who at the time doubled as foreign minister), sent more than a thousand police officers to
accompany him.
His clear responsibility for the most calamitous act of the year induces Barak to deny the und
eniable.
According to Morris, Barak says that
"We know, from hard intelligence, that Arafat intended to unleash a violent confrontation, ter
rorism.
[Sharon's visit and the riots that followed] fell into his hand like an excellent excuse, a pretext
."
"Hard intelligence" is a convenient excuse for everything in Israel. It is secret, cannot be d
isproved
and needs no further proof. However, this does not relieve Barak and Ben-Ami of their responsibilit
y.
Quite the contrary. If such intelligence really existed, it should have prevented Barak from handin
g Arafat
such an excellent "pretext".
Barak says that the visit was coordinated with the Palestinian security chief, Jibril Rajoub,
who was
recently dismissed, partly because some Palestinians believed that he had too close a relationship
with
people like Barak. Morris does not mention a far more important fact: On the eve of Sharon's visit,
Arafat
met Barak and personally warned him that the visit would lead to disaster.
* * *
Clinton's December 2000 proposals came much closer to a solution. On the eve of leaving office
, his
wife by now securely installed as junior Senator from New-York after winning a big majority of Jewi
sh
votes, Clinton could think of his last remaining ambition: to win the Nobel peace price. However, h
is
standing amongst the Palestinians had been severely eroded by his cynical breach of trust when,
contrary to his solemn promise, he placed the sole responsibility for the Camp David failure on Ara
fat.
As Morris puts it,
"Arafat dragged his feet for a fortnight and then responded to the Clinton proposals with a 'Y
es, but...'
that, with hundreds of objections, reservations and qualifications was tantamount to a resounding '
No".
This is sheer demagoguery. Such a response is a normal negotiating stance. Morris calls on De
nnis
Ross, Clinton's special envoy, to corroborate his statement, but Ross, one of the many Jewish offic
ials
who constituted Clinton's team, has since turned out to be too staunch an advocate of Israeli polic
ies to
be a reliable witness.
As a matter of fact, there was no perceptible difference between the answers of the two partie
s. Israel
also responded, as usual, with a "Yes, but..." Who is to judge where "Yes, but..." means Yes or No?
Morris? Barak?
After this new - and positive - Clinton proposal of December 2000, the Taba talks took place i
n
January 2001. Morris:
"The 'revisionists', Barak implies, completely ignored the shift - under the prodding of the i
ntifada - in
the Israeli (and American) positions between July and the end of 2000. By December and January, Isr
ael
had agreed to Washington's proposal that it withdraw from 95 percent of the West Bank with substant
ial
territorial compensation for the Palestinians from Israel proper, and that the Arab neighborhoods o
f
Jerusalem would become sovereign Palestinian territory. The Israelis also agreed to an internationa
l force
at least temporarily controlling the Jordan river line between the West Bank and the Kingdom of Jor
dan
instead of the IDF."
Remarkable. Why did Barak not make these "concessions" at Camp David, when the whole world
was looking on and where they could have done the power of good? Why only "under the prodding of th
e
intifada"?
Morris concedes grudgingly that "at Taba, the Palestinians seemed to soften a little." (A wond
erful
word, "seemed".) "For the first time they produced a map." (Since Barak never produced a map at all
,
this is sheer Chutzpah.) "Seemingly," (again this word) "conceding 2 percent of the West Bank. But
on
the refugees they, too, stuck to their guns, insisting on Israeli acceptance of 'the right of retur
n'..."
This is flatly contradicted by two of Barak's emissaries at Taba. Yossi Beilin, the chief of t
he
delegation, asserts unequivocally that at Taba the two sides were close on all issues - including t
he
refugees. The Palestinians indeed insisted on the recognition of the "right of return" in principle
, and on
Israel assuming responsibility for its part in creating the problem. But they also agreed that the
practical
implementation - the number of refugees to be allowed to return to Israel proper - would be subject
to
agreement by Israel.
This was an historic breakthrough. For the first time, numbers were mentioned, and while the g
ap
remained large, the very fact that the terrible problem had boiled down to haggling over numbers is
extremely important.
Barak would have nothing of this:
"We cannot allow even one refugee back on the basis of the 'right of return'...and we cannot
accept
historical responsibility for the creation of the problem."
This is rather ironical, considering that it was precisely Morris, in his former incarnation a
s a
"revisionist" and "new historian", who, in his one important book, "The Birth of the Palestinian Re
fugee
Problem, 1947-1949", proves that a substantial number of refugees were driven out under a deliberat
e
policy of ethnic cleansing. A pragmatic compromise is possible, but only after Israel accepts
responsibility for its part in creating the problem and recognizes the right of return "in principl
e".
Barak postpones any compromise until the year 2048. A typical passage - the style is the man -
says:
"(Barak) hesitatingly predicts that only 'eighty years' after 1948 will the Palestinians be hi
storically
ready for a compromise. By then, most of the generation that experienced the catastrophe of 1948 at
first
hand will have died; there will be 'very few 'salmons' around who still want to return to their bir
thplaces to
die.' Barak speaks of a 'salmon syndrome' among the Palestinians - and says that Israel, to a degre
e,
was willing to accommodate it, through the family reunion scheme, allowing elderly refugees to retu
rn to
be with their families before they die."
The cynicism belongs to Barak, who, at the time, mentioned the absurdly low number of 4000
refugees who would be allowed to return every year in the framework of family reunions. But is has
always been Zionist dogma that at some time in the future the Palestinians will be ready for a
"compromise" (meaning accepting Israeli terms) while in the meantime Israel goes on dispossessing
them by creating "facts on the ground".
The Taba talks came to an end when Barak unilaterally ordered his delegation to break them off
. The
pretext, this time: elections were too near. One wonders if Barak could have avoided his monumental
election defeat if he had come to the voters, even at the very last moment, with a draft agreement
in his
hands.
* * *
Beyond these issues lurks the mystery of Barak's peculiar behavior at Camp David. After insist
ing on
holding the summit conference without any preparations by sub-committees, he assiduously avoided an
y
real contact with Arafat, neither visiting him at his near-by cabin, nor inviting him to his own ca
bin for
informal conversations.
His closest adviser, foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, recounts that during a state dinner Bara
k sat
"like a pillar of salt", not exchanging a word with Arafat, who was seated next to him. At another,
similar
occasion, when Barak was seated between Arafat and young Chelsea Clinton, Barak demonstratively
talked only with the teenager, ignoring the Palestinian leader. Says Morris:
"Barak appears uncomfortable with the "revisionist" charge that his body language toward Arafa
t had
been unfriendly and that he had, almost consistently during Camp David, avoided meeting the Palesti
nian
leader...Barak says that they met 'almost every day' at Camp David at mealtimes...Did Nixon meet Ho
Chi Minh...or did De Gaulle ever speak to Ben-Bellah? The right time for a meeting between us was w
hen
things were ready for a decision by the leaders..."
Here, In a nutshell, is the whole argument against having the conference at all, exactly as pu
t forward
by Arafat when he refused to come.
But in the circumstances, after the conference had started, this argument is specious. Everybo
dy
familiar with Arafat's style, and indeed with Arab culture in general, knows that personal contact
and
gestures play a big part. Avoiding any real contact with Arafat, even "at mealtimes", shows that ev
en
before the conference Barak could not abide Arafat and was convinced, as he tells Morris, that ther
e
could be no peace "so long as Arafat and like-minded leaders are at the helm on the Arab side." It
seems that this is not his conclusion from the Camp David failure, but rather a reason for the fail
ure.
* * *
Neither Morris nor Barak mention the most curious incident of the conference. As attested by al
l his
own people, Barak "freaked out" during the conference for two whole days, not shaving, not talking
with
anyone and refusing to see even his closest assistants.
Why?
I believe that this brings us close to the heart of the enigma called Barak. Even today many I
sraelis
are puzzled by the question: What did Barak really want? Did he really intend to achieve peace, fai
ling
only because of his ignorance and arrogance, or did he intend right from the outset to bring about
the
failure in order to put the blame on the Palestinians? Quite possibly, he had both aims in mind, in
tending
to discard one or the other as political expediency dictated.
Barak himself has publicly boasted of both. Speaking to left-wingers, he asserted that he has
offered
the Palestinians the most generous terms, which were rejected. Speaking to right-wingers, he made t
he
point that he gave the Palestinians absolutely nothing, not one inch of territory, contrary to the
Likud-
leader Binyamin Netanyahu, who gave the Palestinians most of the town of Hebron and several bits of
territory.
Recently, Barak bragged in an interview on Israeli TVs that by making his generous offers to t
he
Palestinians and the Syrians he unmasked both Arafat and Assad, who rejected them. Together with hi
s
withdrawal from South Lebanon, these are - to his mind - the three major achievements of his short
term
in office.
* * *
So where does Barak stand now?
Clearly, Barak shares the deep Jewish paranoia and existential angst. While he was prime minis
ter,
he saw himself in command of the Titanic, "headed for the Iceberg". He spoke in terms of terrible d
angers
approaching, Iran and/or Iraq obtaining nuclear weapons, Islamic fundamentalists taking over states
bordering on Israel. This should have led Barak to make peace in time, and to call upon the nation
even
now to pay the necessary price.
Instead, according to Morris, he supports Sharon's massive incursions into the Palestinian ter
ritories,
which have almost destroyed the last vestiges of the Oslo agreement and re-instituted the Israeli
occupation in a much more brutal form. He supports Sharon's policy of assassinating Palestinian
militants - called "targeted liquidations" - that had already started during his premiership. He do
es not
believe in peace as long as Arafat is around, a basic Sharon premise. He believes that Israel shoul
d
"begin" to "prepare" for a pullout from "some 75 percent" of the West Bank, while allowing a Palest
inian
state to emerge there and talk about the other 25 percent later. Meanwhile Israel should begin
constructing a "solid, impermeable fence around the evacuated parts of the West Bank". In practice,
all
this is very close to Sharon, who has turned peace into some vague dream for the very remote future
, and
is already building the fence as a substitute to peace.
At the beginning of the second intifada, after the failure of Camp David, Barak's police, unde
r the
control of Shlomo Ben-Ami, killed 13 Arab citizens of Israel during solidarity demonstrations with
the
Palestinians. Barak does not express any regrets, but, quite to the contrary, says that
"Israeli Arabs will serve as [the Palestinians'] spear point...This may necessitate changes in
the rules
of the democratic game...in order to assure Israel's Jewish character."
This approximates to an apartheid mentality, as does his obsession with "demographic sense" an
d
"demographic threats".
One positive result of all this is that at least in retrospect he bemoans the fact the Israel
did not give
up the occupied territories for peace immediately after the 1967 war. Since, at the time, I was the
only
member of the Knesset who demanded that Israel should leave the territories and turn them over to t
he
Palestinians, I am glad to hear this - even if I have never heard it from Barak before.
* * *
In a recent biography of Barak, entitled "Hara-kiri", Raviv Drucker, a reporter for the army r
adio station,
gives a detailed, thoroughly researched account of Barak's reign. The overall picture is of a sever
ely
disturbed human being, whose mindset and emotional limitations have caused him to fail in so many o
f
his relationships and endeavors. According to this account, his failure to establish contact with A
rafat
was no different from his failure in his dealings with everybody else, including his closest assist
ants.
My own theory - which, of course, cannot be proved is that on assuming power, Barak believed t
hat
he had the right formula for ending the historic conflict. Knowing absolutely nothing about the
Palestinians, indeed, never having had a serious discussion with Palestinians, he believed that if
he
offered them a state, they would accept all his conditions and gratefully kiss his hands. When this
did
not happen, he was furious and accused them of all possible crimes. The prejudices and stereotypes,
born of 120 years of conflict and which exist in the conscious or unconscious mind of almost every
Israeli, came to the fore and determined his reactions.
At Camp David he got to the point were the real terms of the solution became apparent to him.
These
conflicted with all his traditional Zionist convictions, causing a severe case of cognitive dissona
nce.
Consequently, like a person looking into an abyss, he drew back in panic at the last moment. This i
s the
cause of his "freaking out" incident in Camp David. This is also the reason for his calling off the
Taba
talks unilaterally, on the eve of the final breakthrough.
The same thing had already happened to him before, when he came very close to a final deal wit
h
Syria. At the eleventh hour, when he realized that he was about to sign an agreement under which he
would have to evacuate the powerful settlers on the Golan heights and to return the territory that
had
already officially become a part of Israel, he drew back. The pretext was that he would not let the
Syrians
reach the waters of the Sea of Tiberias - a distance of a few hundred yards from the line he had ag
reed to
- in spite of the Syrians' undertaking not to use the water. Also, as he told Morris, "had we made
the
required concessions, we would have been seen as weak, inviting depredation."
In order to hide his catastrophic character weaknesses, Barak invented the historic lie of Ara
fat's
rejectionism, now accepted by almost all Israelis and the world at large. By doing so, he paved the
way
to the premiership for Sharon and also caused most Israelis to despair of peace.
A wise old Hebrew adage says: "He who finds fault (with others) finds his own fault." By brand
ing the
Arabs as habitual liars, this self-appointed paragon of Judeo-Christian culture is actually brandin
g
himself.
[6] Haim Baram: Labour’s "Final Flourish"
------- Forwarded message follows -------
From: "H B" <haimbaram at hotmail.com>
Labour’s Final Flourish
Haim Baram
The Great Leader scanned the huge gathering with his tired eyes, and got ready for the final flouri
sh, the
very climax of his speech. As usual on such occasions, he was over-emotional, very angry with his
critics, and full of scorn towards his principal foe. Yet, he was experienced and wily enough, to c
ling to
the party’s tradition, and addressed his rival by his first name. “Haim”, said Binyamin Ben-Eliezer
, trying
to be heard in spite of the impossible din at the Mann Auditorium in Tel-Aviv, “you are creating an
enemy
state with arbitrarily-imposed boundaries, that will have no obligations to you. By evacuating sett
lements
now, you would cause a civil war in Israel, while granting Yaser Arafat and his fellow murderers th
e
ultimate prize for terror”.
An even greater prize is due to any reader, who can find the slightest difference between this me
ssage
by the leader of the Israeli Labour party, and the ideology and policies of Ariel Sharon. Contrary
to
nonsensical comments in the international media, the alliance between Labour and Likud is no longer
a
marriage of convenience, or even a pragmatic necessity, caused by the intifada. This is an ideologi
cal
fusion, gradually structured and carefully explained but reluctantly admitted (for reasons of senti
ment and
political history). However, its irreversible nature can not be denied. Ben-Eliezer addressed the L
abour
Convention on 2 July, and used typical Likud style, terminology and reasoning with total impunity.
The
large majority of the 4,000 delegates sided with him, despite his obvious inferiority as a speaker.
Ben-Eliezer’s Hebrew is notoriously flawed, his grammar non-existent, and the quaint combination of
IDF
slang, taxi-driver’s vocabulary and bureaucratic lingo, never fails to amuse and to amaze. The Chal
lenger,
Haim Ramon, is more articulate but pays heavily for his a justified reputation of a “professional w
recker”.
In 1994 Ramon destroyed almost single-handedly the ancient Histadtrut (General Federation of Labour
)
machine, the most efficient vote-controlling instrument of the Labour Movement. Many Labour hacks
owed their livlihood to the huge (and corrupt) Histadrut, and loath Ramon for obliterating it. Ramo
n fancied
himself as a great moderniser, but this flattering self-image is not shared by the convention deleg
ates,
with few notable exceptions. Both socialists and social-democrats tend to suspect him of selling-ou
t to
the neo-liberals, not without reason. Ramon’s style is typically right-wing social-democrat, Blairi
te to the
core, but his record is unambiguously anti-union, embellished by populist slogans.
The Likud old mentor Zeev Jabotinsky (died 1940) had preached to his disciples to break up the
Histadrut. Ramon was raised and cultivated by Labourites who used to abhore Jabotisky and to portra
y
him as “fascist”. But Ramon is the best executor of the Zionist Revisionist teachings. The irony is
perhaps inescapable, but Ramon, like most Israeli leaders, lacks subtelty, let alone a real, self e
ffacing
sense of humour.
Hence the enormous gap between Ramon’s superior oratory and his dwindling influence in the party. B
en-
Eliezer’s control over the party’s branches and activists could have been impressive, if the party
itself
was viable and functioning. But he leads an ailing body into total oblivion, and his electoral chan
ces
against Sharon or Binyamin Netanyahu are negligible. Ramon pins all his hopes on the future public
opinion polls. He aspires to be elected as the only candidate who can compete with any Likud leader
,
despite his lack of popularity among the rank-and-file Labour activists. This is an unlikely scenar
io, but
still a remote possibility under some special circumstances.
It would be very superficial to ascribe the Ben-Eliezer mounting influence within the party only to
the clout
of the faceless machine. He won a famous victory at the Convention, especially over the Knesset
Speaker Avraham Burg who tabled a motion to leave Sharon’s government and was heavily defeated,
ostensibly on procedure but actually on substance. The delegates, just like the party’s supporters,
simply identify themselves with the Sharon-Peres-Ben-Eliezer government, and abandoned any real or
imaginary pro Palestinian sympathies. The George W Bush speech has practically put paid to the
moderate school of thought in the party, and even Shimon Peres urged the Convention to seek a new
partner for peace. On 6 July he repeated his new conversion to the anti-Arafat camp in an interview
to the
French left-wing magazine, Liberation. Peres probably amazed his sophisticated socialist readers, b
y
admitting publically that his change of heart is solely due to the new guidelines from Washington.
Thus
Peres has lost his last claim to any relevancy as a statesman. To be Washington’s man in Jerusalem
does not require any of Peres’ real or purported gifts. Even Ben-Eliezer can do it quite easily. Bu
t now
even the Liberation readership are fully aware of the fact, that Peres, the great European, has bec
ome
just an ordinary Bushman.
Burg, just like Ramon and his fellow phoney doves, understand that Ben-Eliezer leads the party to a
virtual merger with Likud, even if the process will last several years. Unless Likud decided to all
y itself
with the far-right (and takes a risk to fall-out with Bush), the 2002 Labour has no independent sub
stance
to justify a prolonged separate existence. Ramon does espouse the dismantaling of “remote
settlements”, including the “illegal outposts”. Ben-Eliezer evacuated some empty outposts prior to
the
Convention, and was disappointed that the settlers failed to protest. This is fairly understanabl
e: a big
outcry against the Labour leader for evacuating the fake outposts would have portrayd him as a man
of
peace internationally and enhanced his popularity among Israeli moderates. But the settlers are le
ss
gullible than some of the foreign journalists, and they undersood that Ben-Eliezer is their princip
al ally,
just like his disasterous predecessor, Ehud Barak.
So, the real moot point is the remote settlements, that the IDF can not possibly defend without a t
errible
loss of Israeli lives. But as Ben-Eliezer stated quite clearly, their evacuation can cause a civi
l war in
Israel. This is the real divide between real and phoney Israeli peaceniks. The hard left and Israel
’s Arab
citizens have internalised, that peace will never be achieved without a showdown with the settlers
and
their political allies; the Zionist left (the majority of Meretz sadly included) shy away from such
confrontation. Until recently, this very big and influential group (including most of Israel’s jour
nalists) had
hoped that the US would impose a solution, that would in turn force Sharon to evacuate settlers, ju
st as
he did in the wake of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. These hopes have been frustrated, and the
cowardly leaders of the Zionist left are gradually retreating to the semi-hawkish position they hel
d before
1993.
Ramon has no viable peace platform, apart from a racist fence and the partial anti-settlers rhetori
cs.
Ideologically speaking, this is marginally better than Ben-Eliezer openly pro-settler stance, but R
amon
deliberately evades the very serious issue of the larger settlements, which constitute even more
formidable obstacle for peace.
>From the party politics point of view, Ramon is not as close to Sharon as Ben-Eliezer. This makes h
im a
likely candidate to join forces with Burg and Yossi Beilin in the formation of a dovish Zionist par
ty. Such
development is bound to expedite the merger between the centre-right majority of the Labour party w
ith
Sharon. The scope of this column could not do justice to Labour’s complete sell-out in the socio-
economic sphere, the absolute betrayal of its past as a workers’ party. This will be dealt with in
a
separate article.
Palestinian life under occupation, reports and letters
at: http://www.gush-shalom.org/english/index.html
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Because the United Nations didn't send its protection force.
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- and how to support it in different ways -
at http://www.palsolidarity.org/
----
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In order to receive our Hebrew press releases [mostly WORD documents - not always same as English]
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subject line.
If you want to support Gush Shalom's activities you can send a cheque or
cash, wrapped well in an extra piece of paper, to:
Gush Shalom pob 3322, Tel-Aviv 61033
or ask us for charities in your country which receive donations on behalf of Gush Shalom
(Please, add your email address where to send our confirmation of receipt.
More official receipts at request only.)
For more about Gush Shalom you are invited to visit our renewed website:
http://www.gush-shalom.org/
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